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SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE SEARCH
FOR ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

MELVIN J DUBNICK

INTRODUCTION
Use the word ‘corporation’ in mixed company — that is, any group comprised
of more than accountants, MBAs, attorneys or economists — and the image you are
likely to evoke will be that of a large, impersonal business enterprise headed by a
board of directors, managed by a team of executives headed by a well-paid CEO, with
millions of customers, thousands of employees, offices throughout the world, and
perhaps tens of thousands of big and small investors who claim some stake in the
company. Say the name of a particular corporation — for example, Microsoft, Enron,
Toyota, WorldCom, Sony, Tyco, or Apple — in that same group and the conjured up
images are likely to be as diverse and opined as the group itself.
Taken out of mixed company and placed in context, the modern corporation’s
image becomes clearer in purpose if not in form or reputation. At least within the
jurisdictional sphere, where Anglo-American norms and interests predominate,1 a
consensus view has emerged among those whose livelihood depends on these salient
social-cultural-economic-political actors. This consensus holds that the raison d’être
of corporations — their very existence and success — is tied to their pursuit of value
on behalf of shareholders. That is the pervasive and defining view among students and
practitioners of the modern corporate arts and sciences. Moreover, that consensus is
1

Despite the awkwardness of the label ‘Anglo-American’, I intend for it to encompass those nations
and cultures (social, legal, political and economic) associated with the British governance tradition.
Alternative labels (eg, ‘Commonwealth’, ‘Anglican’, etc) might have been used, so the choice is
offered arbitrarily and with apologies to readers.
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as strongly held by corporate critics as it is by its defenders.2 While this consensus
view of corporate purpose is not without its historical and intellectual challengers, the
practical result of its dominance has been to focus and set parameters around debates
about corporate behaviour and possible solutions to corporate governance problems in
the Anglo-American context. As that context has become both increasingly more
complex and globally hegemonic, however, that consensus has become more
problematic both within and outside its formal jurisdictions. This has been made
especially clear with the passage and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.3
While designed as a politically expedient response to a moral panic fed by
media frenzy,4 Sarbanes-Oxley has brought to the fore fundamental issues about the
nature of the modern corporate form that have lain fallow for nearly a century among
Anglo-American scholars. The debate about the nature of the corporation was preemptively dismissed as mere scholastic banter by no less an authority than John
Dewey in 1926,5 and has only intermittently been revisited.6 The argument presented
here attempts to reopen those discussions with the intent of reasserting a perspective
on the purpose of corporations that allows us to assess corporate governance reforms
such as Sarbanes-Oxley. The perspective I put forward is anchored in the contention
2

See, eg, Edward S Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power (1981); Christopher D Stone,
Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (1975).
3
Pub L No 107–204, 116 Stat 745 (2002) (‘Sarbanes-Oxley’).
4
Jose Gabilondo, ‘Financial Moral Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-BalanceSheet Arrangements’ (2006) 36 Seton Hall Law Review 781.
5
See John Dewey, ‘The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality’ (1926) 35 Yale Law
Journal 655; Bryant Smith, ‘Legal Personality’ (1928) 37 Yale Law Journal 283. The contemporary
reader will be surprised at the ‘post-modern’ and Foucauldian nature of the argument presented in both
these works.
6
See Reuven S Avi-Yonah, ‘The Cynical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical
Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2005) 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 767;
Phillip I Blumberg, ‘The Corporate Personality in American Law: A Summary Review’ (1990) 38
American Journal of Comparative Law 49; Tokusuke Kitagawa, ‘Some Reflections on the Corporate
Theory, Including a Japanese Perspective’ (1960) Duke Law Journal 535; Janet McLean, ‘Personality
and Public Law Doctrine’ (1999) 49 University of Toronto Law Journal 123; William W Bratton, ‘The
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law
Review 1471.
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that modern governance — public as well as private — is at its core based on some
form of accountability. Accountability-based governance, in this view, emerged
historically as an effective response to the central dilemma facing secular rulers of the
embryonic nation-state in the late medieval period — that is, how to maintain and
sustain authority over autonomous subjects who were becoming increasingly aware of
their capacity for discretionary action. The modern corporate form, I will argue,
developed as part of that solution in Anglo-Norman England, and it is in light of those
historical roots that contemporary corporate governance and corporate governance
reforms efforts should be assessed.

I

‘PURPOSE’ AND THE ASSESSMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
The assessment of a law or public policy can be approached in three ways:

prospectively, retrospectively or perspectively. The prospective approach, common to
many professional policy analysis efforts, is to assess the potential or possibility of a
proposal. It reflects the role of assessment as part of the policy design process.
Retrospective approaches, in contrast, are generally associated with technical or
critical evaluations of past performance of the program or its implementers. In
seeking to undercover the underlying logic or ontological context of a policy,
perspective assessments are most helpful for analytic and critical tasks.
In this chapter I undertake a perspective assessment of Sarbanes-Oxley with
the objective of measuring the law and its implementation against a model of the
‘historical purpose’ for which corporate governance regulation and reform legislation
has been developed over the past millennium. As sweeping and daunting as that task
might seem, it proves feasible because in Anglo-American law the corporate form is
historically and inherently linked to the primary purpose of modern governance:
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accountability. As a first step in this (or any) assessment, we must distinguish among
the various foci that might draw our attention. There are several candidate focal points
for a policy assessment. In theory, at least, all formalised laws and policies are
expected to have an explicit statement of intent — the goals or objectives its authors
sought to address — and where these are clear they provide the grounds for
assessment of programs associated with those intentions. This seems simple enough,
except for the practical matter that intent is rarely so clear, especially in matters of
law and policy.7 A second focus for assessments could be the functional role played
by a set of policies or laws. Among political scientists, for example, public policies
and programs are evaluated as much for their symbolic value as for their intended
impacts,8 and the more proactive would regard direct government actions in some
policy arenas (eg, civil rights, environmental protection) to be a functional means to
greater ends.9 Third, a more familiar focus for policy analysts are the impacts that a
policy or other government action has on various segments of the environment.10
Benefit–cost analyses are at their core measurements of the projected impacts
(positive and negative) of a proposal, and studies of the implications of a given
regulation or tax code change or interest rate increase on a segment of the population
also fit this category. A fourth focal point of assessment is the unintended, secondary
or delayed consequences derived from the laws, policies or programs.11
One focus rarely considered is that of purpose, and here we look beyond
immediate intent and function (which are the most closely related) to the underlying
7

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999).
Murray J Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964); Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic
Action: Mass Arousal and Quiesence (1971).
9
Julian Le Grand, ‘Knights, Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy’ (1997) 26
Journal of Social Policy 149.
10
Hidehiko Ichimura and Christopher R Taber, ‘Direct Estimation of Policy Impacts’ (Working Paper,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000).
11
Steven M Gillon, That’s Not What We Meant to Do: Reform and Its Unintended Consequences in
Twentieth-Century America (2000).
8
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— and yet overarching — rationale of the policy effort. This assessment standard is
best explained by example. The intent of a government campaign to deal with a
national AIDS epidemic in a developing country is to prevent it spread and treat the
infected, but in the process it functions as a means for improving the capacity of
health and social services at the community level. Its impact on specific population
segments — for example, children under the age of six, members of a certain ethnic
community — is also a subject of assessment, as is the program’s long-term
consequential impact on government legitimacy. The purpose of the program,
however, is the meta-goal of improving the quality of life for all, and the question
becomes: how does this particular anti-AIDS campaign measure up against that
objective? In a comparable way, the purpose of any contemporary US national
security policy (assuming the conventional perspective) is maintaining world order,
and a particular government decision (eg, the invasion of Iraq in 2003) can be
assessed against that higher standard as well as evaluated according to its intent (eg,
to depose Saddam Hussein), function (what it contributes to stabilising — or not —
the Middle East), impact (the number of Iraqi civilians killed as a result), and
consequence (the bolstering of anti-American sentiment throughout the world). The
seeming indifference to purpose by most analysts is, in part, a result of consensus that
is typically associated with meta-goals within a dominant political ontology at any
particular time and place. That is the case with any anti-AIDS program under
globalised conditions across populations where previous experience with the epidemic
generates as much empathy as sympathy for the afflicted. Where that consensus has
broken down — as in the case of US policy in Iraq — the issue of purpose comes to
the fore and becomes part of the overall assessment and debate over the situation.
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The relevance of all this to the subject of this chapter, Sarbanes-Oxley,
emerges as we approach the fifth anniversary of the law and face a growing number
of assessments that raise a range of issues. Some of the studies, many published
immediately after passage of the Act, focus on the intentions of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Characterised as ‘legislated ethics’12 and ‘legislated risk-management’,13 it was
generally assessed as a means for improving corporate governance through tougher
disclosure requirements and other mechanisms.14 As the law was implemented, more
attention was given to the functional implications of Sarbanes-Oxley. Some focused
on how it became a vehicle for extending the global reach of US market regulation,15
while others considered its role in promoting the nationalisation of US corporate
governance policy.16 Whether intended or not, Sarbanes-Oxley also has begun to

12

Howard Rockness and Joanne Rockness, ‘Legislated Ethics: From Enron to Sarbanes-Oxley, the
Impact on Corporate America’ (2005) 57 Journal of Business Ethics 31; Margaret L Gagne, Joanne H
Gavin and Gregory J Tully, ‘Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Ethics: Exploring a Framework’
(2005) 110 Business and Society Review 181.
13
Colin Linsley, ‘Auditing, Risk Management and a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World’ (2003) 24 Review of
Business 21.
14
Leonard M Baynes, ‘Just Pucker and Blow? An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of
Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ (2002) 76 St John’s Law Review 875; Michael
A Perino, ‘Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (2002) 76 St John’s Law Review 671; Larry E Ribstein, ‘Market Vs
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (2002) 28
Journal of Corporation Law 1; William W Bratton, ‘Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules
Versus Principles Versus Rents’ (2003) 48 Villanova Law Review 1023; John C Coffee, ‘The Attorney
as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1293; Lawrence A
Cunningham, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might
Work)’(2003) 35 Connecticut Law Review 915; Megan N Gates, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Non-US
Issuers: Considerations for International Companies’ (2003) 10 Journal of Commercial Biotechnology
40; Marshall A Geiger and Porcher L Taylor, ‘CEO and CFO Certifications of Financial Information’
(2003) 17 Accounting Horizons 357.
15
Gates, above n 14; Detlev F Vagts, ‘Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance Law’ (2003) 97
American Journal of International Law 289; Huddson T Hollister, ‘“Shock Therapy” for
Aktiengesellschaften: Can the Sarbanes-Oxley Certification Requirements Transform German
Corporate Culture, Practice and Prospects?’ (2005) 25 Northwestern Journal of International Law and
Business 453; Lori V Ryan, ‘Corporate Governance and Business Ethics in North America: The State
of the Art’ (2005) 44 Business and Society 40.
16
Michael E Clark, ‘Hamstrung or Properly Calibrated? Federalism and the Appropriate Role of
Government in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World’ (2004) 1 International Journal of Disclosure and
Governance 385; Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 1521; Roberta Romano, ‘Quack Corporate Governance’
(2005) 28 Regulation 36.
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function as the standard for best practices in non-public firms.17 Impact studies of
Sarbanes-Oxley have also proliferated, covering the obvious targets such as CEOs,
CFOs and corporate directors,18 to its influence on management in general,19 as well
as accountancy, record keeping practices and auditing within the firm.20 Among the
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley, the policy’s role in raising the cost of doing
business,21 as well as its role in reshaping the very nature of the corporate culture,22
are starting to be scrutinised.
What has not been examined as yet is how Sarbanes-Oxley measures up to the
historical purpose of corporate governance policy. This is in large part due to the
general indifference to such purpose inherent in the consensus discussed earlier. To
remedy this I begin by making explicit what that purpose is, by uncovering the
historical roots and development of those governance policies and their ties to a
particular political ontology highlights the need for accountability. My goal is to
measure Sarbanes-Oxley by applying a framework that allows us to critically assess
various approaches to improving corporate accountability.

17

Dan R Dalton and Catherine M Dalton, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation and the Private Company: If
Not a Marriage, Then Certainly an Engagement’ (2005) 26 Journal of Business Strategy 7.
18
Geiger and Taylor, above n 14; Ruth V Aguilera, ‘Corporate Governance and Director
Accountability: An Institutional Comparative Perspective’ (2005) 16 British Journal of Management
S39; Jack Keenan, ‘Corporate Governance in UK/USA Boardrooms’ (2004) 12 Corporate Governance
172; James S Linck, Jeffry M Netter and Tina Yang, ‘The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and Its Era, on the Supply and Demand for Directors’, available at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902665>.
19
Harvey Coustan et al, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley: What It Means to the Marketplace’ (2004) 197 Journal of
Accountancy 43.
20
Bratton, ‘Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting’, above n 14; David L Schwarzkopf and Hugh M
Miller, ‘Early Evidence of How Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation Affects Individuals and their
Workplace Relationships’ (2005) 110 Business and Society Review 21; David O Stephens, ‘The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Records Management Implications’ (2005) 15 Records Management Journal 98;
James A Tackett, Fran Wolf and Gregory A Claypool, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley and Audit Failure: A Critical
Examination’ (2004) 19 Managerial Auditing Journal 340; James A Tackett, Fran Wolf and Gregory A
Claypool, ‘Internal Control under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Critical Examination’ (2006) 21 Managerial
Auditing Journal 317.
21
William J Carney, ‘The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private”’
(2006) 55 Emory Law Journal 141; Larry E Ribstein, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley after Three Years’ (University
of Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper, University of Illinois College of Law, 2005).
22
Michael Power, ‘Organizations and Auditability: A Theory’ (Paper presented at the SCORE
Conference, Stockholm, 2005).
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II

UNCOVERING THE HISTORICAL PURPOSE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Origins are always obscure. If we endeavour to explain the genesis of any event
that happens in our own days and seemingly before our very eyes, a scientific
discovery, a new religion, a war, a revolution, we never get back to the simple
fountain-head, the initial impulse whence it is derived. The stream we follow
upwards brings us at length to difficult marshes and underground pools, never to
a clear spring. If that is true of near events, how much harder is the task to trace
the origins of social phenomena in the unknown and ever receding past.23

MacIver’s observation provides fair warning about an exercise such as the present
one, for in seeking a historical foundation for the purpose of corporate governance
policy we are heading into murky waters.

A

The Modern Corporate Form as Hybrid

The first thing to note is that there are three major claims to the parentage of
the modern corporate form, one ecclesiastic,24 one Italian, and another English.25 Each
reflects a distinct view of that form as a legal actor.
An early corporate form, with roots in Roman law,26 is found in medieval
canon law as a means for dealing with the status of church property that was held in
perpetuity but used by individuals in their ecclesiastic roles. Thus, an artificial and
passive entity was necessary as a legal instrument representing a collectivity (the
church or an order) that would transcend the actions of its membership.27 This
canonical form is manifest today in approaches that stress that the corporation is

23

Robert M MacIver, The Modern State (1926) 25.
Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983).
25
M Schmitthoff, ‘The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company’ (1939) 3 University of Toronto Law
Journal 74. Each of these forms corresponds with a corporate ‘personality’ type in American law: see
Blumberg, above n 6. Blumberg also discusses the recent emergence of a fourth corporate personality
that regards it as a composite of corporate entities. See also Stone, above n 2.
26
F R W I Maitland, ‘Corporation Sole’ (1900) 16 Law Quarterly Review 335.
27
Berman, above n 24; Stone, above n 2, 11–13.
24
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nothing more than a ‘legal fiction’ (persona ficta)28 with an existence (ie, legal
standing) independent of its members.
The Italian — actually Genoan — claim regards the modern corporation as an
outgrowth of a particular joint-stock company form, developed by debt holders to
handle privately-assumed public debts that spread from 15th century Genoa northward
throughout the continent and then England. Unlike the passive canonical form, this
corporate form is an active contractual association of individual shareholders with a
common (most often fiduciary) interest.29
Alternatively, a case is made that the modern corporate form evolved from
partnerships and chartered guilds and related entities of 10th and 11th century England.
What evolved was the corporate form perceived as a distinct autonomous (‘rightsand-duty-bearing’) entity with ‘real’ interests, such as proving charitable services or
the pursuit of profits in an open market where it competes with other ‘real’ persons
(corporate and otherwise).30
The modern business corporation that is the subject of Sarbanes-Oxley and
related laws is perhaps best seen as a hybrid of all three forms, for while it has legal
standing as an artificial person and the structural characteristics of the joint-stock
form, its existence is closely tied to the same ‘realist’ logic that forms the foundation
of municipalities, associations and other collectivities recognised as active persons
under law.31 The development of that hybrid genre was nowhere more advanced than

28

See George F Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person — I’ (1908) 57 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
and American Law Register 131.
29
George F Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person — II’ (1909) 57 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and
American Law Register 216.
30
While I use a narrative that focuses on Anglo-Norman England, for reasons that become clear below,
the theory behind this view is associated with the German political theorist and historian Gierke: see
Otto F V Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (1958). For an effective attempt at outlining
Gierke’s theory as it relates to corporate forms: see George F Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person — III’
(1909) 57 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 300.
31
Leonard W Hein, ‘The British Business Company: Its Origins and Its Control’ (1963) 15 University
of Toronto Law Journal 134.
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in England and its colonial offspring, and for that reason the ‘stream we follow
upwards’ (in MacIver’s terms) is located in the British Isles. That ‘genre’ was most
clearly defined by US Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall in Dartmouth
College v Woodward in passages worth quoting at length:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality,
and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual
succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single
individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property,
without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual
conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the
purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities,
that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means, a perpetual
succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular
object, like one immortal being. But this being does not share in the civil government
of the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created. Its immortality no
more confers on it political power, or a political character, than immortality would
confer such power or character on a natural person. It is no more a state instrument,
than a natural person exercising the same powers would be. … The objects for which
a corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote.
They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the
consideration, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.32

Two important points about Chief Justice Marshall’s definition need highlighting.
First, the corporation in question, Dartmouth College, was a specific type of
corporation — an ‘eleemosynary institution’ engaged in the charitable work of
providing education. Second, although business corporations do exist at the time of
the decision (1819), it would be 25 more years before the British Parliament passes
the Joint Stock Companies Act 184433 (‘Companies Act’) that provides for
incorporation through a registration process rather than through royal charters or acts
of legislation.34 Thus, despite strong associations with business enterprises, the

32

17 US 518, 637–8 (1819).
See John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary
Idea (2003).
34
There are two other means for an entity to assume corporate status. One is through a finding in
common law court where a non-corporate entity might be given de facto standing as a corporation to
facilitate judgment (see Maitland, above n 26); and the other is through ‘implication’ via legislation or
other government action that treats an organisational form (for example, a voluntary association or a
33

The GovNet eJournal
Dec 2007 vol. 1 no. 2

149

‘purpose’ of a corporation is not found in its type (for example, charitable,
proprietary, etc). Nevertheless, at the time of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision there
were already well-known business enterprises with corporate forms, mainly in Britain
where royal or parliamentary charters were required to deal in lucrative ventures
involving exploration or foreign trade, or in activities that involved charging tolls and
fees for the provision of public roads, water and sewer systems, etc. For most of the
17th and 18th centuries outside these arenas there were few advantages for business
enterprises to seeking corporate status (which were costly to procure and often
restrictive) and a good many non-corporate enterprises, operating along the lines of
the joint-stock company model emerging out of Italy, thrived.
A turning point came in 1719 when the British Parliament passed the
infamous Bubble Act,35 which required enterprises that ‘presumed to act as a
corporation’ to either seek a charter, or face legal action as ‘public nuisances’.36 That
Act was terminated in 1735, and during the period between the 1730s and 1844 a
number of changes took place that would eventually result in the Companies Act of
that year as well as related legislation applicable to banking.37 At that point the
benefits of incorporation — especially the cover it provided shareholders through
limited liability — became extremely attractive and the rush was on in the United
Kingdom, and eventually in the US where several states enacted favourable laws of
incorporation.

labour union) as a distinct corporate entity: see Editorial, ‘Incorporation by Implication under the
Sherman Act’ (1917) 30 Harvard Law Review 263.
35
Formally the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporation Act of 1719. The law went into
effect in 1720, a few weeks before the ‘South Sea Bubble’ fiasco that it is associated with took place.
36
Margaret Patterson and David Reiffen, ‘The Effect of the Bubble Act on the Market for Joint Stock
Shares’ (1990) 50 The Journal of Economic History 163, 167–71.
37
Frank Evans, ‘The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Limited Trading Company’ (1908) 8
Columbia Law Review 339; Frank Evans, ‘The Evolution of the Joint-Stock Limited Trading
Company: VII Trading Companies Incorporated under General Act of Parliament’ (1908) 8 Columbia
Law Review 461.
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Despite the transformation of the corporation into a form most often
associated with business enterprises today, in terms of ‘purpose’ it retains its
association with its historical roots reflected in Chief Justice Marshall’s definition.
But where do those roots lead?

B

Inventing the Corporate Form

While no less an authority than Blackstone had attributed the invention of the
corporation to the Romans,38 our corporate (canonical-Italian-English) hybrid has
comparatively modern (or at least late medieval) connections. In tracing the genesis of
the corporation a century ago, Robert L Raymond offered an evolutionary narrative
that highlighted the emergence of collectivities in both secular and ecclesiastic
realms. While initially not recognised in law or by any generalised form of
governance, these ‘natural’ collectivities39 (for example, towns, convents, villages,
monasteries, boroughs, guilds) developed into important economic and social
(religious) actors and key factors in the political dramas that played out in 11th and
12th century Europe, and especially in England. Their very existence outside the
dominant legal arrangements of the time, argued Raymond, called for a ‘new legal
theory’ that would provide a common approach to all the various forms that these
many-bodies-acting-as-one entities. ‘The oneness had to be given a place in business
and in law as something definite.’ What eventually emerged was the idea (taken from
the developing body of canon law) of a ‘fictitious’ or ‘artificial’ person,40 one that
took an identity in law and governance distinct from the non-fictitious bodies (corpi)
it included. And thus, as formally recognised through charters and other legal actions,
the ‘incorporated’ entity was born.
38

Maitland, above n 26, 336.
Raymond terms them ‘unit interest or oneness’.
40
Robert L Raymond, ‘The Genesis of the Corporation’ (1906) 19 Harvard Law Review 350, 359–62.
39
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Raymond places so much stress on the natural evolution of the corporate form
that he overlooks the implications of the early acts of formal recognition, which are
central to our understanding of the purpose of corporate governance, ie the issuance
of the first known royal charters to a corporate-like entities (boroughs, towns, guilds),
particularly by William I and William Rufus, his successor. In a fashion similar to the
rush to incorporation by businesses in the 19th century, the early charters were sought
by those collectivities for the protections and rights they bestowed. But it is critical to
our understanding of ‘purpose’ to note that these charters were granted in name of the
sovereign within the context of newly emerging form of governance initiated under
William I and developed under his successors. In fact, if there was a watershed event
that punctuated the evolution of the modern corporation in its early stages, it was the
form of accountable governance created in 1086 at Salisbury, when William I
convened a meeting of representatives from all segments of his English realm and
required of them an oath of fealty.
The historical importance and distinctiveness of that event must be understood
in context. The 11th century was a time of considerable political turmoil. The collapse
of the Holy Roman Empire had created a political void, and the Papal state in Rome
had yet to consolidate its hold on power. Authority over both ecclesiastic and
temporal matters throughout Europe had ontologically and practically devolved to the
level of feudal lords, rendering the old political order weakened and leaving open
opportunities for expansion and conquest by the strongest among the lesser nobility.
This was the setting in which William, Duke of Normandy, pursued his claim to the
throne of England based on a promise made by Edward the Confessor and the support
of the papacy. Having succeeded at Hastings, he faced the task of: (1) subduing (and
often replacing) the defeated but still powerful Anglo-Saxon lords; (2) making good
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on his promise to Rome that he would regain control of ecclesiastic affairs in
England; (3) satisfying the desires of his Norman supporters for the spoils of war; and
(4) legitimising his rule in a land where the foundations and traditions of governance
ran counter to his interests. Unless he succeeded in dealing with these pressures, he
would go down in history as just another invader from northern Europe who had
landed, conquered and left a minor mark on the British Isles. William I effectively
had three options for dealing with these problems: extended conquest (force of arms);
oaths; and charters. He put all three approaches to use. After 20 years of consolidating
his rule of England mainly through force of arms that extracted pledges of fidelity
from the most recalcitrant among his new subjects, he turned to a different type of
oath in 1086, just a year before his death. In English law,41 the tradition of fealty oaths
was long standing42 and there was a requirement that all ‘free men’ pledge to a lord.
What was controversial about William I’s approach was the claim for such a pledge
directly to the king. Moreover, as significant was that the Salisbury Oath was pledged
immediately after the completion of the Domesday census, which had effectively
given legible form43 to the size and content of the English realm that William I had
conquered and ruled. Thus this oath involved more than a pledge of fidelity; it also
included an acknowledgment of the Norman king’s claim to sovereignty over
everything within his realm.44 To an important degree, the oath taken at Salisbury
established a reciprocal relationship between the modern central secular ruler and the
ruled. In seeking the oath, William I was effectively acknowledging the reality that
41

William I and his successors made a point in their own coronation oaths and other known statements
that they planned to honour the ‘law of King Edward’ the Confessor, and thus explicitly adopted the
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his rule depended on the deference and cooperation of his subjects, many of whom
could (and sometimes did) operate as autonomous ‘free men’.45 As de facto
autonomous agents pledging fealty to the king, the subjects accepted the
responsibility granted by the crown for those parts of the realm with which they had
been entrusted and, in turn, obligated themselves to giving an account of those
holdings when called upon to do so. They became what Maitland (following Gierke)
termed ‘right-and-duty-bearing’ subjects,46 and the acceptance by autonomous agents
of responsibility and obligation to the governing principal marked the birth of
accountable governance.
That unique approach carried over into the extended issuance of charters, a
practice that became increasingly common throughout medieval Europe, especially in
regards to the legal creation of urban centres as pockets of ‘liberties’ within feudal
realms.47 Among the examples cited by Berman, the Anglo-Norman charters initiated
by William I and his successors stood out for the explicit connection to the crown,
and this approach characterised charters granted to individuals,48 guilds,49 and other
collectivities. Accountability to the crown was thus a pervasive characteristic of the

45

The evidence to support this is found in this history of royal charters granted to markets and guilds
which indicates quite clearly that the chartering process did not create those entities but rather
acknowledged and gave them protection and support as ongoing enterprises that could not be ordered
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activities thrived in England and elsewhere despite the attempts of local lords to control them, and they
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Chartering was therefore a means for co-opting and gaining some degree of control over autonomous
agents that would otherwise operate outside the law and pose constant threats to emerging regimes.
Supporting this view is the fact that early charters were given to ongoing enterprises and more often
than not contained provisions that were facilitating nurturing rather than controlling and restrictive: R
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English charters that formed the instrumental foundation for the modern corporate
form.
This connection between the birth of accountable governance and the
embryonic corporate form found in those charters is critical to understanding the
‘purpose’ that forms our standard for assessing policies and laws related to corporate
governance. The corporation is more than a mere artificial person or an association of
shareholders. In the Anglo-Norman tradition it exists as an ‘accountable’ institution,
in the sense of it being an autonomous agent defined by its responsibilities and
obligations to the sovereign entity that is its principal.50

III

CLARIFYING THE STANDARD

Viewing the creation of the corporate form in this way — that is, as an
accountable institution — adds a core, defining dimension to the traditional definition
of the modern business corporation, and establishes a perspectively useful standard of
purpose for the assessment of corporate governance reform. Typically characterised
for analytic purposes as an artificial or fictional legal entity (reflecting the
ecclesiastic roots) comprised of shareholding owners (the Genoan tradition) and
committed to some collective goal (in the English tradition of making a profit for its
owners, providing public conveyance for its constituents/customers, etc), we can now
add its inherent condition as an accountable (rights-and-duties-bearing) institution.
Put in direct terms, by granting a corporate charter to an enterprise, the state has
effectively determined (or at least declared) that the entity is ‘fit to be held
responsible’ (for example, to be called to account) for its actions and activities.51 The
50

This view of accountable governance is further developed in Melvin J Dubnick, Situating
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51
See Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (2001) for the
philosophical basis of my approach.
The GovNet eJournal
Dec 2007 vol. 1 no. 2

155

‘purpose’ of corporate governance, therefore, is to maintain and sustain that fitness
for accountability, and it is credible to regard the purpose of corporate governance
reform — what we regard as ‘assessable’ for the present task — to be the protection
and enhancement of that fitness. Seen in this light, we are able to demarcate and
differentiate the view of corporate governance that emerges from the English
‘accountability’ tradition and those of its historical alternatives. For present purposes
we will label those alternatives the ‘stakeholder’ and ‘fiduciary’ models.

A

The Stakeholder Model

Today’s consensus view of corporate governance in the business and finance
literature (especially in the US) takes its cue from the narrow conceptualisation of
‘principals’ derived from the Genoan joint-stock company tradition, and has been
expressed by one source as the ‘ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment’.52 The problem of corporate
governance, in this view, is how owners and others who provide capital for the
corporate entity shape, direct, regulate, etc the operations of the agency or firm to
enhance the probability that they will receive some value from their financial effort.53
It is governance by investors and financiers and for investors and financiers.
At the heart of many discussions of corporate governance based on the
stakeholder model was the controversy initiated in 1932 with the publication of Berle
and Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property.54 Observing a growing
problem of distance between ownership and management, their analysis helped define
the central issues of corporate governance in terms of how to get the
52

Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal of
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management/agents to follow the wishes of the owner/principals.55 One result is a
myopic approach to corporate governance that has turned into conventional wisdom
among students of business enterprises.56 That this myopia afflicts the model’s critics
as well is evident in the many reform efforts that seek to make the corporation more
‘responsible’, by either broadening the definition of relevant stakeholders, or
modifying corporate decision rules to include socially responsible actions.57

B

The Fiduciary Model

For those following the canonical law tradition, the focus shifts from
stakeholders (narrowly defined by their financial stake) to the corporate entity itself.
Governance in this model is driven by fiduciary responsibilities for the current and
future well-being of the artificial entity that has legal status as a corporate person. In
contrast to governance by and for financial stakeholders, those who govern in this
model are required to put aside personal interests and concerns — those of the
shareholders as well as their own — in order to act on behalf of the well-being of the
collectivity (the ‘oneness’) itself.58
The importance of this distinction from the financial stakeholder model is
exemplified in the case of the proposed ‘Hershey Company’ sale in 2002. The
55
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fiduciary obligations of the corporate entity that held controlling interest in the firm
(the Hershey School Trust, a charitable enterprise established by the founder of the
Company) required it (or at least those making decisions for the Trust) to offer its 30+
per cent stake in the Company for sale. In response to severe criticism from other
Company shareholders and other stakeholders, the Trust’s managers held that, despite
their own personal sympathies and views, their hands were effectively tied by the
legal (fiduciary) responsibility; they had to do what was best for the Trust itself. Only
the successful issuance of a legal injunction requested by the State of Pennsylvania
halted the sale, but this episode highlighted the difference between the governance
models derived from the two traditions.59

C

The Accountability Model

Corporate governance in the accountability tradition of the English model
stands simultaneously separate to and ‘above’ (in the inclusive sense) that of the
stakeholder and fiduciary forms. It is distinct from the joint-stock company form in
putting the interests of stakeholders (financial and otherwise) in a secondary (albeit,
not unimportant) position to that of a ‘higher principal’ (for example, the sovereign,
public interest, public good). What distinguishes it from the legalistic canonical
(fiduciary) model is the status it gives the corporate entity as an active ‘rights-andduty-bearing’ (albeit artificial) person.60 The English model corporation, in other
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words, has more than passive legal standing; it possesses a ‘franchise’ to take action,
in the classic sense of that term, as:
a right, privilege, or power, of public concern, which cannot be exercised by private
individuals at their will, but must be secured by grant, in some form, from the
sovereign power of the territory in which it is to be exercised. It carries with it an
assurance of right of user, similar in character to grants of other rights and things,
and there is a reciprocal agreement on the part of the grantee to use it in accord with
public policy.61

The often-cited James Kent Commentaries on law is even more explicit on the
obligation of the incorporated franchisee to actively pursue its authorised tasks. The
grant of a franchise in the form of corporate standing contains ‘an implied covenant
on the part of the government not to invade the rights vested, and on the part of the
grantees to execute the conditions and duties prescribed in the grant’.62
The governance of such a franchise requires at minimum a process that
assures the entity’s ongoing commitment to chartered functions and tasks, as well as
the capacity to give an account to those among it principals who seek such. From this
view, concerns for stakeholder interests and/or fiduciary responsibilities to the
collective well-being can be added, but in its most fundamental form corporate
governance must meet the standard of accountability. It follows that any effort at
corporate governance reform should be assessed in light of the accountability-purpose
standard, if for no other reason than to determine how far the corporate form has
become distanced from its historical purpose. No doubt, most contemporary attempts
to regulate or change corporate governance reflect an indifference to the
accountability standard. The preoccupation with shareholder and stakeholder rights
and control, for example, has driven much of the intermittent reform focused on
corporate management practices in the US and elsewhere.63 A concern with
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traditional fiduciary responsibility (that is, to the interests of the corporate entity itself
rather than its ‘owners’ or creditors) had faded somewhat with the elevation of
shareholders to sole role of principal,64 but it has made a comeback in recent years in
calls for a shift away from shareholder value and toward increasing corporate value65
and enhancing corporate trust and integrity.66 While these reform efforts and
proposals can be assessed on their own terms, what we are seeking here is to apply the
accountability standard.
When assessing pre-Sarbanes-Oxley reform efforts, therefore, the issues could
be put retrospectively in positive or negative terms. In a positive sense, the question to
be asked is whether (and how) the reform efforts enhance or strengthen the
accountability aspect of governance; in the negative, the assessment would focus on
whether and how the reform efforts weaken accountability. Sarbanes-Oxley, however,
offers a distinct opportunity to assess corporate governance reforms that were
intended to enhance the reputation of corporate enterprises as accountable institutions
in the historical sense. The crises that emerged from the scandals at Enron and other
enterprises required some action — symbolic or otherwise67 — to counter their
delegitimising impact. But the circumstances surrounding this flurry of corporate
difficulties called for more than readjustments in how firms would handle stakeholder
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or fiduciary issues. For the first time since at least the Great Depression it was the
accountable nature of the corporate form that was at issue. How well did SarbanesOxley measure up to that challenge?

IV

ASSESSING ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK

Despite its popular association with performance measures, there is no known
metric for accountable governance.68 Nevertheless, it is possible to identify various
forms of accountability-relevant relationships that can provide the basis for
comparison and assessment of governance mechanisms and proposals for reform. To
accomplish this I apply a framework developed in an earlier paper69 that allows us to
categorise policies and their implementation into four types or relationships involving
account-giving. The four types range from those impacting directly on the behaviour
of account-giver, to those that operate at the level of moral suasion. They are
presented here as four distinct ‘orders’ of accountability.
First order (‘performative’) accountability entails a situation requiring
explicit and direct acts of account-giving. Such ‘speech acts’70 typically require at
least two parties — an account-giver who is doing the account-giving, and an
account-receiver who is the intended target of that act. The fact that account-giving is
68
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an action unto itself — not merely a statement about something, but a ‘doing’ per se
— makes it what linguists and philosophers call a performative act;71 hence the
appellation performative accountability. To designate it as such does not imply that it
is a meaningless or vacuous act — on the contrary, as is the case with other
performatives such as ‘I promise’ or ‘I bid’ or ‘I bet’, the awkward ‘I account for’ has
some force and meaning within a given context.
At its most basic and informal, performative account-giving can overlap with
the social act of ‘reason giving’ recently highlighted in the work of Charles Tilly.
Humans are reason seeking/giving animals, Tilly asserts, and we engage in various
forms of reason giving in a range of social relationships from the most mundane (eg,
practices of etiquette) to the unfathomable (eg, attempting to comprehend the events
of 9/11 as they occurred).72 But despite a fundamental similarity in form as well as a
degree of overlap, the defining line between reason giving and account-giving is
crossed where the account-giver is assumed/perceived to be ‘responsible’ to the
account-receiver for the condition, action, or event that is the focus on the
relationship.
In most scholarly examinations of first order account-giving, stress is placed
on its role as a functional and appropriate reaction to some error or faux pas, and thus
most analyses concentrate on the social conventions for making excuses or offering
justifications.73 Although such mitigatory and explanatory first order acts of accountgiving are common place, they often overshadow equally important purposes for
engaging in them, as found in information-generating (monitoring, surveilling) forms
such as bookkeeping, reporting, responding to audits, subjecting oneself to inspection,
71
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etc.74 In all these instances, the acts of account-giving — whether in the form of
publishing an annual or quarterly report, issuing a press release, giving testimony at a
trial or before a legislative committee, offering a public apology, providing a written
elaboration of reasons for taking actions, releasing or posting of transcripts — are
responses to a direct (although sometimes implied or perceived) solicitation from real
or potential account-receivers. The solicitation can take the form of a speeding ticket
issued by a police officer, a reporter’s microphone placed in front of one’s mouth, a
demand by an auditor to see one’s books, a phone call from one’s supervisor seeking
an explanation for some action, a public accusation, etc. In each case the effort is to
generate a performative response from the account-giver.
But not all accountability is performative. Most forms of accountability in fact
occur in anticipation (sometimes anxious anticipation) of the need or requirement to
engage in performative accountability. They relate, in other words, to a ‘presumptive
account-giver’.
Second order (‘regulatory’) accountability, for example, does not involve
direct and explicit account-giving, but is instead manifest in following the guidance,
rules and operating standards of the presumptive account-giver’s task environment.
This is regulatory accountability and it makes use of the potential ‘threat’ of being
called to performative account to establish and maintain restrictive and directive
control over the account-giver.
In a widely discussed work on the nature of cyberspace, Lessig takes note of
four major mechanisms that society relies on to constrain or limit behaviour,
including law, social norms, the marketplace and the ‘architecture’ of the operating
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environment.75 Of those four,76 law and architecture generate second order
accountability by creating operating environments in which the possibility of some
form performative account-giving plays a significant role in shaping and directing the
behaviour of agents. The use of law as a basis for regulatory accountability is welldocumented both historically77 and in contemporary analyses of requirements related
to rule of law standards.78 Lessig’s major contribution has been to highlight the role of
task environment ‘architecture’ in the regulatory endeavour. This architecture —
which Lessig notes is manifest in the ‘code’ of everything from computer programs to
constitutions

—

determines

such

things

as

access

and

the

range

of

discretion/autonomy an individual has while operating in the constructed
environment. It obviously places various checks on the range of choices or decisions
that an accountable individual can make, but it also functions as a rationale for
constrained or directed behaviour. Thus, if called upon to provide an account for his
or her behaviour (that is, to engage in first order accountability), the person who
operates within the architecture would refer to its rules, parameters, SOPs, etc.79
Underlying all this is the belief that first order, performative accountability would be
triggered if an individual was found to be challenging or violating the code.
In contrast, rather than focusing on the control of conduct, third order
(‘managerial’) accountability relies on account-giving as a means of eliciting
75
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purposive behaviour. Accountability in this sense is intended to be motivational rather
than regulatory, and in that sense the term managerial accountability80 seems most
appropriate.81 The logic is simple: the measure or assessment of an action or condition
for which the account-giver is assumed ‘responsible’ is, under the right conditions,
regarded as an effective means for motivating that individual to improve that action or
condition in the future. Under third order accountability, the focus is on designing
task environment conditions (again, architectures) that facilitate those motivations
rather than control or constrain them. Thus, we see the extensive use of incentives and
sanctions in third order accountability.82
While second order (regulatory) and third order (managerial) accountability
operates primarily through the architecture and machinations of task environments,
fourth order (‘embedded’) accountability operates through the norms and values of
the account-giver — through what Foucauldians designate as ‘governmentality’.83 We
will use the label embedded accountability to stress the internalisation of the sense of
80
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‘moral responsibility’ characteristic of this form, and take special note at this point of
its association with professionalism and high levels of commitment to living up to
perceived expectations.

V

ASSESSING SARBANES-OXLEY

Fourth order accountability stands as both foundational and aspirational in the
present situation. On the one hand, once in place as the values and norms of corporate
governance — that is, once embedded in the corporate culture of a firm — it can
shape and direct the use of performative, regulatory and managerial accountabilities.
On the other hand, establishing an embedded fourth order accountability is an
extremely challenging task, perhaps on par with Plato’s strategy for creating his
Republic. Optimistically, one can imagine policies that reward corporations for
developing and fostering corporate cultures that give priority to accountable
governance standards.84 But others would argue that the effort would require not
merely changes in policies related to corporate governance, but a wholesale (and
unlikely) transformation of legal ontology under which the Anglo-American system
operates.85
As it happens, the agendas for most corporate governance reform efforts are
aimed at lower aspirations than creating corporate forms that are in sync with the
accountability model. Requiring automobile manufacturers to meet set standards for
average fuel economy on their vehicles reflects a first order (performative) solution to
the problem of having those firms act responsibly. Often reform policies aim at
improving performance by modifying the regulatory regime in which they have to
84
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operate. Deregulation of the airlines, buses and other forms of interstate public
transportation can be regarded as shifting the second order accountability (regulatory)
regime toward the open market, with the unfettered firms having to deal with a
different set of account-giving relationships. Modifications in policies regarding the
taxation and reporting of executive compensation and benefits can and have had
impacts on third order (managerial) accountability decisions. In each of these cases,
the different orders of accountability have modified some aspect of corporate
decision-making.
But in the wake of the corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, etc, the
agenda for corporate reform expanded and rose to the level of the goals implied in the
accountable governance model. However, short of a miraculous transformation in the
legal ontology of Anglo-American corporate operations through fourth order reforms
that alter the existing ‘governmentality’, reforms would have to come through policies
based on the lower order approaches. In that sense, there is a need for a SarbanesOxley-like initiative that contains provisions that at least push in that direction. The
immediate question is whether Sarbanes-Oxley is such an initiative. The answer is
clearly no.

A

The Performative Provisions

Sarbanes-Oxley contains 69 sections, with about two-thirds having some
provisions that relate to a type of accountability relationship. Due to the necessary
formalisms required of such a statute, some sections were definitional, others were
redundant in regard to the substance of their accountability provisions (for example,
Title XI sections contained authorisations for actions to enforce previous sections),
and still others contained provisions that were not related to our task.
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Of what remained, there were 17 provisions for what can be termed first order
accountability mandates; that is, they detailed an action (for example, a filing of a
disclosure, the development of an ethics code) that had to be taken by some actor. Of
those, nine were aimed at external actors whose activities impacted (directly or
indirectly) on the corporation. Of these nine, seven related to accounting firms hired
to serve as auditors of the company. The other two required actions by outside
attorneys and the security analysis industry. The remaining eight first order provisions
involved mostly disclosure and reporting requirements. Two of the disclosure
requirements were general in nature, requiring complete (s 401) and quick (s 409)
reporting. An additional two were targeted at specific officers, with s 302 requiring
CEO and CFO certification of annual financial reports and s 1001 (which was a sense
of the Senate provision) strongly suggesting that the CEO sign the corporate income
tax filings.
Four additional disclosure provisions were actually indirect mandates that
would clearly have third order effects. Section 407, for example, requires a report that
confirms that at least one member of the audit committee is a financial expert, with
the obvious implication for recruiting such an individual. Section 406 requires a
similar disclosure about a corporate code of ethics for financial offices, again
impacting on managerial operations. Section 403, seeking disclosure of personal
financial transactions by corporate officers and major shareholders, would require the
development of relevant tracking and reporting mechanisms. But perhaps the most
significant provisions with secondary consequences among the disclosure requirement
are found in s 404, which mandates reports on the operations and effectiveness of the
firm’s ‘internal control structure and procedures for … financial reporting.’ The
development and operations of such mechanisms (if they did not already exist) have
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recently been noted as the most costly and problematic of the Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements.86
Regarding these various first order provisions, there seems only the faintest
relationship between them and objective of re-establishing accountable governance.
Implied in some provisions (for example, the CEO/CFO signoffs; the code of ethics
for financial managers; the development of effective internal control systems) is the
assumption that such legal requirements will make it clear to the affected officials that
they have moral obligations that go beyond their own self-interest or even those of the
firm’s shareholders and stakeholders. Whether there are connections between these
requirements and fourth order (embedded accountability) effects involves empirical
questions that might prove difficult to answer in the short term.

B The Regulatory Provisions
Sarbanes-Oxley also contains 21 provisions that can be categorised as second
order accountability actions. Six are found in Title I of the Act which relates to the
establishment and authority of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a
non-profit entity that deals directly with the outside accounting firms the serve that
audit needs of the corporations. In addition, three other sections (201, 202, 906)
contain regulatory provisions related to the outside auditors. In fact, in Title II of the
Act, only s 206 relates directly to the firm by prohibiting the hiring of officers who
had worked for those outside auditors during the previous year. The remaining 11
second order provisions are scattered among the other Titles and range from
determining the composition of corporate audit committees (s 301), to prohibiting the
extension of credit to firm officers, or direct (s 402) to protections for whistle blowers
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and informants (ss 806 and 1007). Among the most important of these second order
accountability provisions are those that extend and enhance the criminalisation of
malfeasant behaviour of corporate officers (see, eg, ss 807, 906).
Once again we are confronted with questions about the assumed link between
these second order provisions and the objective of developing an embedded sense of
moral obligation among corporate agents. Given the details of these sections, the
desire for retribution and restoration may have taken priority over any intent to
change the moral commitments and behaviour of corporate officials. But assuming
that long-term moral and behavioural change was part of the design, there seems little
in the law that addresses the potential for the hazards (moral and cognitive) associated
with regulatory actions.87

C

Managerial Provisions and the Absence of Fourth Order Provisions
In addition to the third order actions implied in the disclosure provisions of ss

404, 406 and 407 (noted above), Sarbanes-Oxley contains only one accountabilityrelevant provision that is somewhat managerial. According to s 304, if the firm’s
reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission are determined to be noncompliant, the firm’s major officers (CEO, CFO) must forfeit bonuses and other
compensation rewards. It should be noted that at various points in the deliberative
process, members of Congress offered a number of management-relevant ideas for
consideration. But opposition to overly intrusive policies won the day, and only s 304
remained as an explicit managerial provision when Sarbanes-Oxley was finally
passed. The irony is that, short of some fourth order expression of substantive
standards to guide corporate decisions, third order managerial provisions might have
87
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enhanced the Act’s promise as a stimulant for accountable governance. As it is, the s
404 requirements for reporting on the design and effectiveness of internal control of
financial records has drawn the most reaction from corporations who complain about
the ambiguities and costs associated with its implementation.
Finally and most notably, there is no single provision in the legislation that
can be classified as a fourth order accountability action. There is nothing in SarbanesOxley to deal directly with the assumed objective of establishing or improving the
corporation’s purpose as an accountable (‘rights-and-duties-bearing’) institution.

CONCLUSION
Of the many efforts at corporate governance reforms that have emerged in
recent decades,88 Sarbanes-Oxley stands out as a watershed event in several respects.
It has clearly been a force in both the nationalisation of US regulation of corporate
governance89 and the Americanisation of global regulatory regimes.90 And its impact
on the daily relationships within business environment have certainly been notable, as
anyone who works in the accounting or securities field can attest to.
But, because it was drawn up in haste, Sarbanes-Oxley can be seen as a
missed opportunity in one important respect. It is probably the case that the political
circumstances of the moment generated as good an effort as might have otherwise
been expected in a political system that seems addicted to a policymaking-by-crisis
mode. But a more thoughtful and informed debate might have led to considerations
about the nature of corporate accountability that have been off the reform agenda for
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at least a century in the US.91 As it now stands, the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and
their enforcement have generated their own problems,92 and the long postponed
debate over the role of corporate entities as accountable institutions is likely to be
extended.
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